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Abstract:  
 
Ireland's social partnership process, now under attack from a number of quarters, has 
repeatedly been charged with being 'undemocratic' in that it undermines the 
sovereign position of elected political representatives, with key policy formulation 
and decision-making taking place in fora outside the institutions of representative 
democracy. These critiques echo those against new forms of networked governance 
more globally. A key question therefore is how (and if) democracy may be deepened 
within social partnership or its potential successor(s). This article addresses this 
question by employing a post-liberal democratic framework to examine social 
partnership in practice, and by drawing lessons from another partnership process, 
Malawi's PRSP. Drawing from Malawi's experience, it is argued that democracy can 
be deepened within social partnership when governance deliberations and 
negotiations are conducted under conditions of vibrant public debate and genuine 
perspective-based representation, and when the communicative and discursive norms 
are widened to allow for such representation.   
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Introduction 
At a time when some of the world’s most visible wars are played out in the name of 
democracy, charges of governance systems being ‘undemocratic’ have acquired a 
particular potency. Such a charge has repeatedly been made against Ireland’s social 
partnership process, both at an academic level (Ó Cinnéide, 1999, 2006), and more 
popularly, among actors from across the political spectrum (see for example Fine 
Gael and Labour’s concerns about Social Partnership’s ‘democratic deficit’ 
(www.finegael.ie), Charlie McCreevy’s trenchant criticisms quoted in Hastings, 
Sheehan and Yeates (2007), and ISME’s charges (The Irish Times, 2007)). The 
principal cause of concern is that social partnership undermines the sovereign position 
of elected political representatives with key policy formulation and decision-making 
taking place in fora outside the institutions of representative democracy. 
 
These critiques echo charges against recent, more participatory forms of governance 
more globally. Viewed through a more global lens, Ireland’s social partnership is not 
unique. Since the 1990s, governance across a wide range of states, in the global North 
and South alike, has come to be characterised by states networking with a range of 
actors that cut across private and social spheres. Variously described as participatory 
governance (Newman, 2005), multi-governance (Bang, 2004), joined-up governance 
(Reddel, 2004), co-governance (Kooiman, 2003, Dean, 2007) or, after Castells’ 
(2004) ‘network state’, network governance (Bogason and Musso, 2006, Triantafillou, 
2004), within such arrangements the role of the state is described as shifting from that 
of 'governing' through direct forms of control, to that of 'governance', in which it 
collaborates with a wide range of civil actors in networks that cut across the public, 
private and voluntary sectors, and operate across different levels of decision-making. 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP), a national partnership process 
bringing together a range of state and civic actors in policy deliberation, and 
institutionalised in over seventy countries worldwide comprising around one third of 
the world’s population (IMF/World Bank, 2002), is another example of such new 
forms of governance1. As with social partnership, one of the core concerns of 
commentators observing these diverse processes across the globe is the question of 
whether these deepen or undermine democracy within their member states (see 
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Bobbio, 1987, Pierre, 2000, Held and McGrew, 2003 on governance more broadly; 
Cornwall and Brock, 2005, Weber, 2006 on PRSPs specifically).   
 
Such concerns are significant given the growing ubiquity of partnership arrangements 
both locally and nationally in countries throughout the world. While, in Ireland, it is 
now unclear if social partnership will survive within the current challenging economic 
climate, it is highly likely that the governance ethos and mechanisms which underpin 
it will continue in some form or other (for instance see Murphy and Hogan 2008 on 
the predecessor to the current social partnership model). As Sorensen and Torfing, 
surveying the European political spectrum, assert, ‘network politics is here to stay’ 
(2005: 198). In this context, whatever the future configurations of governance in 
Ireland, an ongoing concern will be how democratic or otherwise they prove and, 
more particularly, how democracy might be deepened within and through them. 
 
With this in mind, this paper employs a post-liberal democratic framework, with 
specific reference to the work of Iris Marion Young (2000), to examine how 
democracy might be deepened within Ireland’s social partnership, affording a voice to 
greater numbers of citizens in determining the developmental direction of the country 
in years to come. Employing a framework drawn from the work of Young, lessons are 
drawn from another partnership process, Malawi’s PRSP, to elicit some conditions for 
deepening democracy within the process. Malawi’s first PRSP strategy – a three year 
strategy - was formulated in 2000/2001 and launched in 2002.  Its second strategy, 
known as the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) – a five year 
strategy – was formulated in 2005/2006 and launched in 2007. While Malawi’s PRSP, 
embedded in a country which clearly differs significantly in economic, social, 
political and cultural terms might seem an unlikely source of lessons for social 
partnership in Ireland, in a globalised world of starkly similar governance 
arrangements (both social partnership and Malawi’s PRSP are national development 
strategy processes; both are underpinned by concepts of partnership, participation and 
good governance; both involve a range of civic actors; and both result in consensus-
based agreements) these contextual differences prove the very source of such lessons. 
The principal lesson from Malawi’s process is that political culture plays a key role. 
More specifically, we learn from Malawi’s process that democracy can be deepened 
when governance deliberations and negotiations are conducted under conditions of 
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vibrant public debate and genuine perspective-based representation and when the 
communicative and discursive norms are widened to allow for such representation. 
The findings presented below also show that contrarily, under conditions of muted 
public debate engendered by norms of confidentiality such as those imbuing Ireland’s 
social partnership, where negotiations and deliberations take place within invisible 
spaces, and where the likelihood of ‘mis-framing’ of constituents’ issues and analyses 
is increased, democracy is not deepened, rather it is diluted and undermined.  
 
 
Theorising Social Partnership: Liberal and post-liberal democratic 
theories  
 
While critics of social partnership who charge it with being ‘undemocratic’ do not 
explicitly outline their understanding of what, in their view, constitutes a ‘democratic’ 
process, their persistent references to the sidelining of national parliament and elected 
public officials implicitly suggests that their comments come from the standpoint of 
liberal democratic theory, with its attendant emphasis on institutions of representative 
democracy. Deriving from the development of liberalism, and linked to the idea of 
individual rights, contemporary liberal democratic theory focuses on the rights of 
citizens to freely choose their rulers at periodic intervals (Manin, 1997). Whether 
from the perspective of its aggregative or integrative strands2, this body of theory 
places considerable emphasis on the formal institutions of representative democracy. 
Within the state, power between the citizens and the state is balanced on election day 
when voters elect political leaders (Macpherson, 1977). Equality is thus attained 
through the ‘one citizen, one vote’ process, thereby assuring an equal influence on 
leadership selection. 
 
Following liberal theory therefore, governance arrangements such as those provided 
for by social partnership may indeed be seen, as its detractors contend, to undermine 
liberal democracy in a number of ways. First, they undermine the equality of access 
posited by the liberal model by creating separate channels of political influence with 
differential access for select social actors. Second, their restricted transparency 
undermines the ability of citizens to make informed political choices. Third, the 
delegation of decision-making powers to specific governance actors (social partners 
and public/civil servants) undermines the ability of elected representatives to control 
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political processes and outcomes. And fourth, the influence of transnational actors 
within contemporary governance arrangements (in the form of the invisible, yet 
significant influence of international capital) transcends the nationally delineated 
boundaries posited by traditional liberal democratic theory.  
 
However, the liberal democratic image of politics as an activity proceeding 
exclusively through the national parliament is, in contemporary times, questionable. 
As we are well aware, both before and after elected leaders pass a particular bill, or 
instruct public administrators to take certain action, crucial decisions are made within 
complex policy networks (both national and international) that set the political 
agenda, frame and define the policy problems, and craft and implement the 
appropriate solutions. Taking the reality of such governance arrangements as a 
starting point, the question therefore becomes how (and indeed if) democracy might 
be deepened through and within such arrangements. This question has been the focus 
of theoretical work by Sorensen and Torfing (2005) who argue that post-liberal 
democratic theory proves more useful in examining contemporary governance 
processes. Drawing on this theoretical work and focusing in particular on post-liberal 
theories which measure the democratic quality of governance by its ability to produce 
just and equitable outcomes, this article examines how democracy can be deepened 
within social partnership. The use of a theoretical framework focused on equity of 
outcome, I believe, proves particularly apt to the Irish situation given the growing 
inequalities that characterised the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom period (Kirby, 2004, 
NESC, 2005; see also Kelly, McGuinness and O’Connell, 2008 on unequal wage 
differentials between public and private sector employees arising from recent wage 
agreements), inequalities which can only give rise to even greater concerns regarding 
equitable policy outcomes following the Irish economic downturn.    
 
While some post-liberal theorists focus on renouncing the liberal idea that the 
parameters of democracy are limited to the boundaries of the nation state (Hirst, 1994, 
Held, 2006, March and Olsen, 1995), others are concerned with the inclusion of 
different kinds of political actors and their diverse perspectives (Benhabib, 1996, 
Fung and Wright, 2003, Mansbridge, 1996, Mouffe, 1996, Young, 2000). Of these, 
the work of Iris Marion Young is perhaps the most comprehensive and thus, the most 
useful to our examination of social partnership. In her book, Inclusion and Democracy 
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(2000), Young expounds on her theory of democracy in a manner which interweaves 
the concerns and issues of many post-liberal theorists. She then goes on to set out 
normatively the conditions under which democracy may be deepened within diverse 
policy processes.   
 
Drawing from John Rawls’ theory that democracy should be measured by its ability to 
provide just solutions, Young (2000: 27) argues that, since there is no objective 
common good according to which it is possible to measure whether the outcome of a 
political process is just or not, justice must be ensured procedurally. Political, or 
governance processes are thus deemed democratic of ‘all significantly affected by the 
problems and their solutions are included in the discussion and decision-making on 
the basis of equality and non-domination, and if they interact reasonably and 
constitute a public where people are accountable to one another’ (Young, 2000: 29-
30). Following this theorisation, Young is interested in the particular context of the 
inclusion through representation of structurally disadvantaged groups within political 
society in general. With these concerns in mind, she draws particular attention to two 
elements of policy processes – communication and representation respectively.   
 
 
On communication: Diversity and debate 
 
It is now well established (Rosell, 2004) that participants within more inclusive policy 
processes which draw in a range of actors and perspectives are likely to come from 
diverse backgrounds, and are unlikely to have shared sets of myths, assumptions and 
frameworks of interpretation. In these contexts, where participants are likely to have 
different levels of what Young terms ‘articulateness’, Young argues that 
communication should take place and, indeed, be fostered, in many different forms 
and at many different levels. Communication norms within policy processes should 
provide space for participants to relate, share and analyse their experiences as well as 
to explore possibilities for ameliorating their situation. In this context, Young draws 
attention to the importance of different forms of speech. According to Young, 
communication within inclusive fora should include story-telling, protest, the use of 
pictures/images, and problem-framing as well as problem-solving. Problem-framing, 
as opposed to problem-solving, involves investigating and interrogating the root 
causes of identified problems and seeks to address structural and systemic 
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inadequacies rather than merely addressing their symptoms. One important 
communication form identified by Young is that of public debate. Taking up 
Habermas’s ideas on the need for ‘public spheres’ within societies wherein, he argues, 
individuals become part of a wider political community through engagement in public 
discussion and deliberation (Habermas, 1990), Young argues that such public fora 
serve an important function if they facilitate inclusive processes of communication 
(2000: 177-178). Taking account of the main criticism of communicative inequality 
which is often levelled against Habermas3, Young argues that public actors (state and 
civic) have a role in actively fostering communication and debate at this popular level.   
 
On representation: mediating relations     
While the ‘Westminster model’ (Tansey and Kermode, 1967/8) alluded to by critics 
of the social partnership process envisages parliament as the sole site of deliberation, 
decision-making and representation of ‘the peoples’’ interests, clearly in Ireland this 
is no longer the case in practice. Moreover, the failures of an equality of 
representation are evidenced in the increasing socio-economic inequalities within 
Irish society (Kirby 2004, NESC, 2005). As we have seen, this issue of equality of 
representation, as a means of enhancing equality of outcome, is a key feature of 
democratic systems for Young. She argues that those affected, in particular those 
heretofore adversely affected, by particular policies be represented within fora 
deliberating upon and deciding on these policies. Just who does this ‘representing’, 
and how they achieve this are key questions. Young argues that representation is not 
about assuming the identity or substituting for a group of people (the constituents), 
rather it is about mediating between different actors. She goes on to argue that it 
follows that any evaluation of a process of representation should examine the nature 
of the relationship between the representative and the constituents. The representative, 
though separate from the constituents, should be connected to them in determinate 
ways. Constituents should also be connected to one another. Young (2000: 128) notes 
that ‘Representative systems sometimes fail to be sufficiently democratic not because 
the representatives fail to stand for the will of the constituents, but because they have 
lost connection with them.’    
 
At a time when liberal theories of democracy fall short in assisting our navigation 
through post-national, increasingly differentiated, and for many, increasingly 
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alienated societies, post-liberal democratic theory offers valuable new insights into 
how democracy within policy processes such as social partnership might be deepened 
in the dual senses of equality of access and equality of outcome. Drawing particular 
attention to the two core elements of communication and representation highlighted 
by Young, the remainder of this article examines Ireland’s social partnership in this 
light, drawing lessons from Malawi’s PRSP, and highlighting the key conditions for 
deepening democracy within Ireland’s process.   
 
The analysis presented below draws from both secondary materials and qualitative 
interviews conducted between 2005 and 2007 with seventy-four state and civil society 
actors within both Ireland’s social partnership and Malawi’s PRSP processes. Civil 
society actors interviewed on social partnership were principally members of the 
process’s Community and Voluntary (CV) pillar, whilst those interviewed on 
Malawi’s PRSP were principally members of the main civil society network involved 
in the process, the Malawi Economic and Justice Network (MEJN). While both 
processes also comprise actors from capital and labour (in social partnership these are 
organised into employer, farmer and trade union pillars), the choice of interviewees 
for this study reflects the theoretical framework used with, following Young, its 
explicit focus on the inclusion of marginalised groups in efforts to deepen democracy 
within and through the respective processes.   
 
 
Communication within social partnership: Restricting communication 
within, stifling communication without 
 
Applying Young’s normative framework to social partnership, four principal aspects 
of communication within the process stand out. The first three relate to 
communication norms within the process itself, while the fourth highlights how these 
norms extend outside the process also.   
 
First, within the process the scope of deliberations and debate is considerably 
restricted with certain issues off the table altogether. For example, issues relating to 
refugees and asylum seekers and the broader issue of racism, although of particular 
interest to some members of the CV pillar, are deemed to lie outside the remit of the 
process. Thus, none of the social partnership strategies make any reference to these 
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issues, nor do they appear in the background papers prepared by the National and 
Economic Social Council (NESC), one of the principal institutions of social 
partnership. Two members of the CV pillar explain their difficulties in bringing these 
issues to the process. 
 
There was the whole thing about refugees and asylum seekers, they [state 
actors coordinating the process] just would not engage in conversation about 
it, in discussion about it.  They said that’s not for this agreement [social 
partnership strategy].  It’s not going in there.   
(CV pillar member) 
 
Another straw was that close to the end we were trying to raise issues of 
racism and we were told [by state actors] that racism is not discussed in 
social partnership.  
   (CV pillar member) 
 
 
Second, in contrast to Young’s exhortations to engage multiple forms of 
communication owing to the multiple levels of ‘articulateness’ of participants, 
communication norms within social partnership are highly extremely narrow. Policy 
discourses are privileged, with ‘problem-solving’ rather than ‘problem-framing’ the 
dominant norm. Thus the emphasis is on addressing problems as they stand without 
addressing or investigating their root structural causes. As a key state official within 
the process puts it: 
 
I take the view that the social partners have actually a major role to play in 
both identifying and solving some of the major challenges that face us as a 
country.          (State official) 
 
 
This ‘problem solving’ discourse has been adopted by social partners themselves, as 
reflected in their own characterisations of the process below: 
 
I think the nugget of partnership is problem-solving.   
(Union pillar member) 
 
 
Social Partnership is, as they [state actors] put it, a problem-solving process.  
If it stops being that, or if we get the problem solved, we don’t have to be 
bothered about Social Partnership in a sense.      
(CV pillar member) 
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However, as one representative from the CV pillar explains in relation to both the 
issues of care more broadly and childcare more particularly, the root causes of the 
problems remain unexplored. 
 
If you actually look at how they [NESC officials] identify the problem, it’s so 
narrow… We’re again back to, back to services, lack of places.  That’s not the 
problem in relation to care.  You’ve got an unsustainable situation in relation 
to care in Ireland and the fact that the state has predominantly seen the whole 
issue of care as being the private responsibility of families and, within that, 
women… And the exact same thing is happening in relation to childcare.  And 
until we can shift that ground we’re not going to get the type of system and the 
type of supports that people need.   
        (CV pillar member) 
 
 
Wider communicative or behavioural norms as advocated by Young (2000) are also 
actively eschewed, by state and civil society partners alike, as some pillar members 
learned as they attempted to build awareness of, and support for particular issues 
employing less ‘professional’ methods of communication. In 2003, attempting to raise 
awareness on emerging issues around policies towards minorities (immigrants and 
Travellers specifically), a section of the CV pillar staged a walk-out of a formal 
plenary session in Dublin Castle. One of the group recounts the reaction. 
 
The trade unions in particular were extremely annoyed that we had done this.  
And also so were the Department of an Taoiseach. Because, and I thought it 
was very interesting at the meeting, Dermot McCarthy said, ‘you can’t bring 
politics into this plenary’.  But this is all about politics.  So what the hell does 
that mean?...The other organisations in the [CV] pillar were extremely 
annoyed that we had done that to them even though they all knew and it 
wasn’t like we were surprising them.   
 (CV pillar member) 
 
 
Third, as already evidenced in the quotation above raising shortcomings in the 
problem-solving discourse around care and childcare, social partnership is highly 
gendered. Phrases like ‘hard nosed’, ‘hard ball’ and ‘being business-like’ are used to 
describe attitudes and behaviour within the negotiations. Indeed, women are certainly 
in the minority within all the institutions of social partnership.  In the words of one 
participant, ‘…it’s the big boys, and it’s the big, and the boys’. A number of CV pillar 
members point to the ‘machismo’ that pervades the negotiations, with participants 
expected to work extremely long hours and attend meetings late into the night 
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although many note that this is unnecessary as they spend most of their time waiting 
to meet with state actors and ‘just sitting about twiddling our thumbs’. A number of 
ex-social partners noted in interview that, with family commitments at home, they 
simply could not participate in the process any more. This gender bias is also manifest 
in both the communication norms imbuing the process, characterised by one social 
partner as ‘hard-nosed negotiations that suit the unions’, and the manner in which 
certain discourses are ignored. A member of the CV pillar describes the frustration of 
attempting to raise a debate on the issue of patriarchy within NESC.   
 
Now I mean I do think particularly in NESC it was an extreme, well I suppose 
lots of places are, but it seemed like really, really difficult around gender 
inequality, and around women’s inequality, and the issue of patriarchy, and 
how did that actually affect policy outcomes. It just really, a really difficult 
place for that…there was no real analysis around – you know – how is 
inequality caused? What are the structural barriers there to prevent it?   
 (CV pillar representative) 
 
 
These restrictions on communications extend beyond the walls of the Department of 
An Taoiseach also however to its impact on public debate and deliberation more 
broadly. A fourth issue in relation to communication norms in social partnership 
which has become increasingly apparent in recent years – ironically, by its absence 
rather than presence – is the reduced level of public debate surrounding the broader 
developmental policy aspects of the process, together with the virtual invisibility of 
CV pillar members in the process. Although the process received some attention in its 
earlier years, with the CV pillar employing the media to raise public debate in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the dearth of coverage of the CV pillar’s contributions during 
and beyond the 2006 talks stands in marked contrast to these earlier years. An issue of 
confidentiality surrounds more recent developments in social partnership. As a key 
state official of the process notes, ‘I suppose we would also expect… a degree of 
observance of the no surprises principle’. This has clearly been communicated in 
subtle ways to CV pillar members. 
 
There’s definitely a confidentiality anyway and I suppose you have to monitor 
that reasonably as well, there’s probably a level of discretion.  But there’s 
also a spirit of the agreement or a spirit of social partnership which says ... 
we’d rather you talk to us than go public. Or they [state officials] may not say 
it but you’ll know it from body language, people not returning your calls, 
people being snotty.        
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       (CV pillar member) 
 
The work of the NESF, the NESC and the process’s various working committees 
remains virtually unknown publicly, while the final negotiations themselves are also 
shrouded in secrecy. The CV pillar in the 2006 negotiation did not adopt a media 
strategy, although members stressed that all were free to issue statements or carry out 
interviews as they saw fit. It is noteworthy that, when questioned in 2007 about their 
lack of media work, a number of members of the CV pillar had come to see the media 
in terms of a lobbying tool, almost as a last resort, rather than as an instrument to 
mobilise popular debate. Some noted that they needed to be very careful in employing 
it in that their interests could suffer as a result. 
 
To be honest it has happened before where something leaked… the 
government might be willing to make a move on something… and it was 
leaked to the media and the officials.  Suddenly the Minister reads the paper… 
so you have to be careful in the sense that you could actually damage your 
own interests… we would use the media judiciously… you want to be very 
careful. 
        (CV pillar member) 
And again another pillar member 
 
…you need to be careful not to use it [the media] too often.  One, you upset the 
other organisations in the negotiations if you don’t manage it right.  Two you 
upset the civil servants…. You need to be careful.   
(CV pillar member) 
 
 
Yet commentators note that this lack of public debate on key issues has silenced 
dissent with one ex-CV pillar member noting that ‘you don’t get the crises because 
they’re negotiated away’. And so, while it is generally agreed among all participants 
that to get movement on something it must be perceived as a ‘crisis’, the lack of 
public debate on core issues mutes the elevation of any to the necessary level whereby 
it may be deemed as such.   
 
Applying Young’s theoretical framework therefore, with particular reference to her 
work in the key area of communication, norms for communications both within and 
without social partnership clearly limit its scope for deepening democracy. It is 
noteworthy that while critics of the process (see for example Allen, 2000, Meade and 
O’Donovan, 2002, Meade, 2005, Murphy 2002) focus on the state as the principal 
orchestrator and agent of these limitations, the evidence presented here shows how 
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these norms have been internalised and are being actively promoted by civil society 
actors also. These actions of civic actors lead us on to the second core element of 
democratic processes highlighted by Young – that of representation.  
 
 
Matridashka dolls and minimised mediation: Representation within 
social partnership  
 
As we have seen, while charges of social partnership’s inherently ‘undemocratic’ 
nature focus on the apparent side-lining of elected leaders, post-liberal theorists, 
embracing the contemporary reality of the ongoing existence and functioning of 
broader-based policy networks, focus on the forms of mediation between 
representatives and their constituents at all levels. Although a common understanding 
of social partnership (in so far as there is any common understanding given the 
paucity of public debate on the process), as with other policy networks, is of all social 
partners sitting down at a table to negotiate together, the reality is actually very 
different. Comprising a complex labyrinth of multiple institutions and fora, social 
partnership, for the most part, works on a unilateral (pillar members talking to each 
other) or bilateral (pillar to state discussions) basis. With the exception of the NESC 
forum, which offers hotly contested places to only five representatives from each 
pillar, and occasional formalised plenary meetings, social partners rarely meet with 
other pillar members, instead spending most of their time talking with members of 
their own pillar as they attempt to produce joint proposals and inputs as required by 
the communicative norms of the process. As a result, the majority of many social 
partners’ time is taken up in meetings with other groups within their own pillar rather 
than with other actors within the wider process. For members of the CV pillar, many 
of whom were, up until 2003, members of the Community Platform also, this has 
entailed an endless round of meeting after meeting – a virtual ‘Matridashka doll’ of 
meetings, as one participant describes it.   
 
I have to say when I look back at the work we did in the Platform, the amount 
of time that we spent working within that space within a broader, then housed 
within another Matridashka doll called the community and voluntary pillar 
that was in another doll called social partnership, it was just incredibly labour 
intensive.  
(Community Platform member) 
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Another CV pillar member describes the complexity of the bureaucracy; 
 
As a new person coming in I used to go to the pillar… my first induction 
weeks, I went to a pillar meeting and a Platform meeting.  I couldn’t tell the 
difference – where one meeting ended – where another began.  I didn’t know 
what they were about – hadn’t a clue.  I used to find it so bizarre that people 
were just in it, and it was just like a bureaucracy, and that we were part of 
that bureaucracy really.         
     (Community Platform member) 
 
While a number of organisations divide the work involved between two or more 
people, the average estimate of human resource requirements for the process is at least 
one person full-time, with this intensifying during the period of the negotiations. 
Unsurprisingly these requirements exclude many groups from the process, in 
particular smaller groups with limited policy expertise. 
 
To be involved you need to be a national organisation, you need to have some 
sort of resources.  Now that itself a lot of the sector wouldn’t have.  And even 
for ourselves, just to have the time and energy to devote to it is huge in a way.  
And almost too you’d need to be specialised in all of the [policy] areas and 
not just your own because you’re involved in it at every level… It would be 
hard to see how all community groups on the ground could engage at that 
level with a process like this.      
(CV pillar member) 
 
 
With such a heavy demand on limited resources, mediation with constituents has to 
have suffered. This is acknowledged by a number of CV pillar members, some of 
whom, following their expulsion from the process (voluntary or otherwise depending 
on who you talk to. A number of member organisations of the CV pillar who refused 
to sign up to the 2003 strategy, Sustaining Progress, subsequently lost their ‘Social 
Partner’ status and were thereafter excluded from a range of policy fora associated 
(either directly or indirectly) with social partnership.), note that their disengagement, 
from 2003 to 2007, afforded them more time to liaise and reconnect with their 
membership. With the exigencies of the process’ interminable series of meetings 
exacting a high toll in human resource terms therefore, democracy suffers as 
representatives’ connection to their constituents is eroded.   
 
So is social partnership, as its detractors contend, ‘undemocratic’? From the evidence 
presented above and viewed from a post-liberal democratic stance, the process still 
fuels such charges. Discourses remain limited; the strict focus on problem-solving 
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rather than problem-framing forecloses possibilities for structural debates, with 
problem-solving addressing symptoms rather than root causes; the restrictive and 
highly gendered norms of behaviour further limit more diverse modes of 
participation; the norms of confidentiality imbuing the process mute public debate and 
participation in developmental debates more broadly; while the institutional 
exigencies of the process exact a toll on participants’ connection with their 
constituents. The prognosis does not seem good. Yet social partnership, in one form 
or other, will be with us for the foreseeable future. A key question for practitioners 
and scholars genuinely interested in democratising governance in Ireland therefore is 
how social partnership, or any potential successor(s), may be rendered more 
democratic. Malawi’s experiences with a similar process, the PRSP, offer us some 
lessons in this regard.   
 
 
Deepening democracy within social partnership: Lessons from 
Malawi 
 
Malawi’s PRSP was chosen as one from which lessons might be drawn for Ireland’s 
social partnership process for a number of reasons. First, as noted previously, it bears 
many institutional similarities to social partnership; second, it was one of the first of 
over seventy such processes to get off the ground and so provides a number of years’ 
experience to draw from; and third, the principal civil society network involved in the 
process, MEJN, has attracted a significant degree of interest for its energy and 
activism within the international development community. As well as bearing many 
institutional similarities to social partnership, communication norms within Malawi’s 
process display a remarkable similarity to those imbuing social partnership. 
Discourses remain limited to technocratic, problem-solving exercises, communication 
norms within the process are restricted, and more critical voices have been excluded 
from the process.   
 
However, there is one key difference between Malawi’s process and that in Ireland. 
The norms of confidentiality imbuing social partnership, which mute public debate on 
both the process itself and the actions of its actors, are notably absent from Malawi’s 
process. In contrast, Malawi’s PRSP, in particular during its early years, was widely 
publicised by MEJN, through both the national media, and also through MEJN’s 
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publication of popular materials such as a simplified version of the 2002-2005 
strategy which was produced in several local languages and distributed to groups and 
associations throughout the country. As a result of these actions the process has 
stimulated a high level of public debate on both the content of the strategy itself – i.e. 
the country’s developmental options – and the actions of participants within it. As we 
will see, this stimulation of public debate, a key element of post-liberal democracy as 
highlighted by Young (2000) and other theorists, has increased the democratic 
potential of the process, by forcing MEJN to further open the political space afforded 
through the process and mediate more directly the voices, analyses and aspirations of 
its constituency. Precisely how this occurred is outlined below.  
 
 
Democratising governance, democratising political actors: The 
implications of enhanced public debate in Malawi 
 
Initially a platform of 27 Malawian NGOs and religious groups, MEJN was formed in 
2000 with the express purpose of securing broad-based participation in the PRSP. 
Throughout the process MEJN systematically employed the media as a tool to 
increase public awareness on both the existence and nature of the PRSP, and its 
content. Thus MEJN focused a public spotlight on the process, its content, and its own 
engagement within it, thereby stimulating public debate and opening the country’s 
political space. Over time, this came to prove something of an Achilles heel for the 
network however, as global critical debates on NGO legitimacy (see for example 
Hulme and Edwards, 1997, Pearce, 2000, Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, 2006) combined 
with popular debate at a national level to bring MEJN’s agency within the process, in 
particular its effectiveness in mediating the interests and perspectives of its 
membership, under critical scrutiny.   
 
 
MEJN’s initial journey within Malawi’s PRSP resembles that of many members of 
Ireland’s CV pillar. While MEJN began with the intention of bringing more actors in 
– effectively deepening democracy within the process, very quickly network leaders 
adopted the process' dominant communicative norms. Sourcing technical experts and 
acquiring a more professional edge, MEJN leaders began to sideline less capacitated 
(as they saw it) organisations. This increasing control by the network's leadership in 
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turn led to conflict within the network where members, feeling excluded and 
sidelined, accused leaders of becoming turning the network into an NGO in its own 
right. In the words of one network member; 
 
MEJN is a network.  They [network leaders] should not be implementers.  Let 
them use their members…  Of course there have been some clashes between 
MEJN and their members… And people have moved away from getting 
interested in MEJN.  Because MEJN wants to be the implementer.  … I think 
that’s a conflict, that’s where the conflict comes in now.  So let them identify 
what is their role.  Are they facilitators or implementers?  MEJN is not an 
NGO.  The way I understand it, it is a network.  
(Representative of MEJN member organisation) 
 
This conflict, following MEJN’s publicity work, found its way into public debate 
more broadly whereupon MEJN’s leaders began to find themselves confronted with 
charges of illegitimacy. From their early days of relying on the World Bank’s Voices 
of the Poor (Naryan et al, 2000) as a basis for its inputs to the PRSP, MEJN leaders 
were faced with a growing public consciousness that the network had not consolidated 
a grassroots base which might feed into policy and advocacy activities, thereby 
putting into practice the theory of ‘participatory economic governance’ (MEJN, 2004) 
that the network espoused and informing its representation. Indeed, with an office and 
entire staff in Lilongwe, MEJN appeared the very embodiment of the ‘elite’ NGO 
divorced from its roots, as depicted in the critical development literature of the late 
1990s (for example, Hulme and Edwards, 1997, Pearce, 2000). In 2002, cognisant of 
these issues, responding to public critiques, and seeking to consolidate a grassroots 
base, MEJN began to build a local network of representation in the form of what 
became known as the District Chapter Programme.   
 
MEJN’s District Chapter Programme consists of locally elected voluntary committees 
of eight to ten people claiming to represent the interests of their communities at 
district level. Committees have been established in twenty-seven of Malawi’s twenty-
nine districts4. While the initiative for the Chapter Programme came from MEJN 
leaders, committees were elected locally and consist principally of representatives of 
both local NGOs and local community-based associations including youth groups, 
women’s groups, faith-based groups, and trade and business associations. Responding 
to public critiques on its legitimacy to represent ‘the poor’, MEJN leaders’ aim in 
developing the District Chapter structure was to institutionalise a national structure of 
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representation which would enable leaders to bring people’s issues from the ground to 
the national policy arena. In MEJN's view, this was to be achieved by Chapter 
committee members systematically gathering data and information in specified areas 
(food security, health, education etc.) and feeding this upwards to network leaders for 
what MEJN terms its ‘evidence based advocacy’ (MEJN, 2004). Interestingly 
however, Chapter members have a very different vision for their work. In interviews, 
committee members in eight different districts all emphasised that they were 
interested in representing their local communities, bringing issues of local concern 
and interest to local government structures. In particular, members were interested in 
moving beyond the main town within the district (where many committee members 
live) and going out to villages and settlements in outlying areas. Drawing on MEJN’s 
own popularisation of issues of participation and democracy, members were emphatic 
that MEJN’s role lay in facilitating people at the grassroots to articulate their views 
and concerns. As one Chapter member put it… ‘MEJN is for the people… If MEJN is 
only for the boma [district main town] then we are a failure. It’s the people in the 
grassroots who need MEJN more.’. There is, therefore, clearly a divergence of views 
on the role and function of local committee structures, together with understandings 
as to what constitutes representation. While for MEJN leaders, having internalised 
dominant forms of communication, this representative structure is there to collect 
‘evidence’, i.e. carry out research on specific areas in the ‘evidence-based advocacy’ 
which dominates communication norms in both Malawi and Ireland’s processes, 
committee members, employing more popular forms of communication and drawing 
on MEJN’s early work popularising the PRSP and its participative norms, appear to 
view their role as a portal for the views and perspectives of local communities 
(however these may be defined or identified) to be fed upward to key decision 
makers, both through their own Chapter committee representatives at district level, 
and through those of MEJN’s leaders at a national level.   
 
MEJN’s experiences serve to demonstrate a fundamental contradiction between the 
dominant communicative norms favoured within both processes and the requirements 
of democratic representation as theorised by Young (2000). While MEJN struggles to 
maintain its status within the PRSP process, in itself a crucial portal to national policy 
fora more broadly, its locally based membership still lies waiting in the wings, with 
members of some District Chapter committees becoming increasingly vocal about 
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network leaders’ support in their efforts towards more perspective-based 
representation at both local and national level. It remains to be seen how MEJN’s 
leadership will negotiate the conflicting normative demands of state and donors, on 
the one hand, and Chapter members and their ‘communities’ on the other. Bridging 
these relations and poised with one foot in, and one foot out of the hegemonic order, 
MEJN’s future decisions and actions could prove both insightful and inspirational to 
CV pillar members in Ireland caught in a similar nexus.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
So what lessons can be drawn from Malawi’s PRSP which can help deepen 
democracy within Ireland’s social partnership where, as we have seen, the 
institutional and communicative exigencies of the process hamper the ability of social 
partners to connect with and meaningfully represent the interests of their constituents 
and where, perhaps even more significantly, the muting of public debate on the 
process, its content, and the actions of its actors significantly erodes the democratic 
potential of the process? MEJN’s experience in a process with similar communicative 
norms shows the challenges in bridging relations inside and outside the process. It 
also however shows that, if democracy is to be deepened within and through the 
process, these communicative norms need to be widened. Most significantly, the key 
driver in deepening democracy within Malawi’s process is the network’s membership 
on the ground. Spurred on by the actions of MEJN’s leaders in popularising the 
process, the key lesson we learn from the Malawian experience is that, under 
conditions of vibrant public debate and genuine perspective-based representation, as 
witnessed in glimpses in the Malawian case, partnership processes do offer the 
potential to deepen democracy. Contrarily, under conditions of muted public debate 
engendered by norms of confidentiality such as those imbuing Ireland’s Social 
Partnership, democracy is indeed diluted.   
 
Are these lessons applicable to Ireland however? While some argue that the CV pillar 
holds significantly less power than NGOs within PRSP processes, the Irish state's 
palpable anger at the Community Platform and the National Women Council's 
rejection of the 2003 social partnership strategy, with its implicit exposure of 
dissensus, suggests otherwise and demonstrates the strong legitimising power of CV 
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pillar members within the process. While, following their rejection of the 2003 
strategy, core state funding to the principal organisation behind the Community 
Platform, the Community Worker’s Cooperative, was cut, funding to a number of 
non-dissenting CV pillar members was increased (Data received by email 
communication from the Department of Community and Family Affairs). Moreover, 
financial inducement, in the form of the ‘Social Partnership Scheme’, introduced in 
2007 and committing 10 million Euro per annum to CV pillar members (Government 
of Ireland, 2006), has proven successful in attracting dissenting partners back into the 
process. Claims of consensus, partnership and inclusion clearly ring hollow when 
participants dissent. CV pillar members therefore, like MEJN, possess significant 
legitimising power. The challenge is for members to recognise this power, and to 
strategically harness and use it in deepening democracy within the process.  
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1 Originally introduced by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in 1999 as a condition of 
debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), the elaboration and 
implementation of PRSP national development programmes are now a condition of all World Bank and 
IMF funding.   
2 Aggregative theories of democracy define equality in terms of equal access to political channels of 
influence and view regular elections, open and uncensored public debate, and transparency within the 
policy process as key in this, while integrative theories define equality in terms of the influence citizens 
possess in concrete decision-making processes, thereby focusing on political empowerment (for a fuller 
discussion of these two strands within liberal democratic theory see Berlin, 1991). 
3 Habermas’s contributions in this area have been criticised in the respect that they appear to assume all 
actors are able to participate equally and ignore issues of differential power and capacity. 
4 Malawi had twenty-eight districts.  One of these was recently split into two to make twenty-nine.  
MEJN has set up Chapters in all except the districts of N’neno and Likoma. 
